France's Parliamentary Ongoing Crisis: The Dawn of a Fresh Governmental Reality
Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the position over a six-year span.
Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in two years – three of them in the last ten months?
The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.
But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.
Governing Without a Majority
Key background: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.
At the same time, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.
Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.
So much so that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.
A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.
Macron honored his word – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.
With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”
Changing Political Culture
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.
A look at the seat numbers shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.
To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.
Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.
Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.
Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.
Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.
“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”